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1. Introduction 
Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement (M5S) surged onto 
the national political scene just before the 2013 par-
liamentary elections and succeeded in getting nearly 25 
percent of the overall vote. Moreover, it was the only 
political movement that was able to attract votes 
across the different regions in Italy, making it the only 
national party in the country (Diamanti, 2013). It elect-
ed 163 deputies―109 to the lower Chamber of Depu-
ties and 54 to the Senate. Even Forza Italia with its 
phenomenal rise in the 1994 elections did not produce 
similar results. In that election, Silvio Berlusconi’s party 
reached 21% and did better in the northeast and south 
than in the center or northwest. In addition to the rapid 
breakthrough of M5S, another noteworthy element in 
that election was the level of voter volatility, one in ten 
voters remained undecided until the election and more 
than 40% of electors voted in a different way compared 
to the 2008 general elections (Bordignon & Ceccarini, 
2013a, p. 5). The nonparticipation level reached a rec-
ord 26 percent (about 5 percentage points above pre-
vious elections). While the above descriptive facts are 
interesting in themselves, they do not provide any ex-
planation that accounts for the movement’s success in 
the 2013 elections (Diamanti, 2013). 
In this article, we explain the rise of the Five Star 
Movement by providing a contextual analysis as to why 
Italy, more so than other Western European democra-
cies, has been beset by diverse forms of populism such 
as the Northern League, Forza Italia and the Five Star 
Movement (Woods, 2014). Our analysis is based on 
primary and secondary data sources, a web-based sur-
vey of M5S adherents, and limited open-ended inter-
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views with M5S supporters. The overarching thesis of 
this article is that the rise and persistence of populism in 
Western European democracies is an indication of a cri-
sis of representation (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Al-
bertazzi & Mueller, 2013; Santoro, 2012; Taggart, 2002, 
2004). A crisis of representation can arise from different 
factors―structural and/or conjunctural―, such as a 
change in generational loyalties, a drop in partisan iden-
tification, or an exogenous shock to the political system. 
In the case of Italy, the crisis was initially an internal one; 
however, external factors have played their part. 
The postwar party system that took root in the early 
1950s and lasted until the early 1990s underwent a 
gradual and then accelerated decline as its social, ideo-
logical, and institutional links to Italian citizens eroded 
(Kriesi, 2014). The crisis of the Italian First Republic led 
to what some deemed a transition to a so-called Sec-
ond Republic. For many, the adoption of mixed elec-
toral rules in the referendum in 1993 that moved Italy 
away from the previous proportional representation 
system and recast party competition into center-left 
and center-right blocs served as the strongest indica-
tion that a transition had occurred. Bull (2012), Bull and 
Rhodes (2009), and Newell (2009) argue, however, that 
the focus on the purported transition from a First to 
Second Republic has obfuscated the continuity and 
persistent problems with political representation in Ita-
ly. As Bull and Rhodes (2009, p. 6) state: 
The equilibrium of Italy’s post-war system was 
clearly “punctuated” by the political and economic 
upheavals of the early and mid-1990s. But what fol-
lowed has been less of a “transition” to something 
new, and more of a post-crisis process of institu-
tional (re-) stabilisation and negotiated change in 
which the ‘new’ (or at least substantial parts of it) 
looks remarkably similar to the “old”. 
We situate the rise of Five Star Movement within the 
broader context of the crisis of representation of the 
First and the so-called Second Republic. 
This paper is organized into six parts. We start by 
framing the rise of Five Star Movement within an ana-
lytical and theoretical model that explains the rise of 
populist movement along three dimensions: politiciza-
tion of resentment, exploitation of social cleavages, and 
the polarization of feelings of non-representation. 
Then, we focus on the crisis of representation that has 
characterized the Italian political system for quite some 
time. Next we lay out the populist discourse employed 
by M5S to politicize resentment. Followed by an analy-
sis of the movement’s reframing of social cleavages in 
Italy with a web-based ground up mobilization strategy. 
Finally, we provide an empirical snapshot of who sup-
ports Grillo’s movement, concluding with a brief as-
sessment of the contradictory aspects of the move-
ment that could threaten its long-term durability. 
2. The Analytics of Populism and the Crisis of 
Representation 
As an analytical tool, populism has gotten somewhat of 
a bad reputation as an amorphous concept with little 
empirical traction. Ironically, much of this negative rep-
utation comes from scholars who employ the concept. 
The frequently uttered cri de coeur from them regard-
ing populism is that it is a vague concept that lacks a 
coherent definitional basis. As Ernesto Laclau (1977, p. 
143) emphatically put it, “few [terms] have been de-
fined with less precision. We know intuitively to what 
we are referring when we call a movement or an ideol-
ogy populist, but we have the greatest difficulty in 
translating the intuition into concepts.” Nearly every-
one employing the concept begins with this type of ob-
servation: that the concept lacks a clear theoretical 
frame and that its use causes confusion due to the ab-
sence of a settled and shared definition. Then, most 
studies of populism proceed with the assertion that de-
spite its lack of settled and shared definitional basis and 
methodology, there is a broad consensus in the litera-
ture that the concept has, at least, three core compo-
nents that can be viewed as common denominators 
that function as a relatively coherent conceptual 
framework that suffices as the basis for empirical as-
sessments of populism (Mudde, 2004). 
Jagers and Walgrave (2007, p. 322) make a good 
case that “populism always refers to the people and 
justifies its actions by appealing to and identifying with 
the people; it is rooted in anti-elite feelings; and it con-
siders the people as a monolithic group without inter-
nal differences except for some very specific categories 
who are subject to an exclusion strategy”. These three 
core elements anchor populism analytically and empiri-
cally. It is our view that Jagers and Walgrave are correct 
and thus those in the extant literature who claim that 
populism lacks a settled and shared definition are 
wrong. Essentially, what many authors in the literature 
on populism are doing is confusing the conflicting im-
peratives of the concept with its analytical utility. 
All concepts have conflicting imperatives, defined as 
“interdependent but contradictory goals, priorities, or 
motivations that underline many social and political re-
lationships” (Gould, 1999, p. 439). As an analytical tool 
however, populism has a coherent definitional basis. 
What it lacks is a neatly articulated theoretical identity. 
In other words, populism is not a theory in terms of 
having a system of consistent assumptions; however, it 
is a robust concept that can be fitted into different the-
oretical frameworks. In this respect, the conflicting im-
peratives of populism have contributed to its ability to 
capture within its conceptual net historical, cultural, 
and context-specific forms of populism. The analytical 
utility of populism has been particularly pertinent in 
understanding the diverse developments of populism 
in many Western European democracies. Pappas (2012) 
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provides a theoretical model that encapsulates the 
three core analytical elements of populism and helps in 
explaining the rise and, in some cases, persistence of 
populist social and political movements. He theorizes 
that “populism obtains when a certain political entre-
preneur is able to polarize politics by creating a cleav-
age based on the interaction between ‘the people’ ver-
sus some establishment, thus forging a mass political 
movement” (Pappas, 2012, p. 8). He adds that popu-
lism is best analyzed “as a strategic power game aiming 
to transform potential majorities into real ones by cre-
ating novel social cleavages”. Pappas (2012, pp. 8-9) 
specifies three mechanisms that are sufficient condi-
tions in understanding the causal link between crises of 
representation and populism. The first is politicization 
of resentment: 
When resentment is high, established parties, 
whether in government or in opposition, are more 
likely to try containing it lest it upset existing politi-
cal alignment patterns. This is not however true for 
populist parties, which thrive precisely on politiciz-
ing resentment and the sense of victimhood that 
accompanies it. 
The second mechanism is the exploitation of social or 
political cleavages. It is understood as a key step in the 
way that populist leaders exploit latent or salient feel-
ings of non-representation. Populist leaders and the 
rhetoric they use are able to do this by identifying a po-
litical or social divide between “the people” and the 
people’s enemies. Failure of “true” or “real” represen-
tation is presented as the fault of the status quo. This is 
reflected in a common assertion that populism builds 
upon, a “we versus them,” a Schmittian divide that 
splits societies into two broad social categories, “the 
people” and some “establishment”. The third mecha-
nism is polarization of resentment and feelings of non-
representation. Pappas (2012, p. 9) concludes that this 
mechanism is essential for populism to emerge in the 
form of a party or mass movement since “it involves pit-
ting the disenchanted and resentful people against the 
privileged establishment in an antagonism of such a 
great intensity that it may threaten to tear society apart. 
When polarized, societies tend to cluster around oppos-
ing poles; as the majority of the people cleave to one 
pole or the other, the middle ground of politics gets lost 
and the median voter becomes a rare occurrence”. 
3. Crisis of Representation: The Italian Case 
Starting in the 1980s, Western European democracies 
have seen the emergence of populist movements and 
parties along with the rise of anti-status quo discourse. 
While populism has spread across Europe, the populist 
phenomenon has gained traction in some countries 
more than others. This is particularly the case in Italy 
(Ignazi, 1996; Tarchi, 2008; Woods, 1992, 1995, 2010, 
2014). With the collapse of the Christian Democratic 
and Italian Communist parties’ hegemony in the early 
1990s, the Italian party and political system underwent 
a significant transformation (Mannheimer, 1991, 1993). 
An insurgent regional populist movement, the Lom-
bardy League, later known as the Northern League and 
one of Italy’s riches businessman, Silvio Berlusconi, 
emerged as pivotal populist players on the Italian polit-
ical landscape in the context of the implosion of the 
two main pillars of the postwar Italian political system. 
The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the ending of com-
munism in Eastern Europe had a direct impact on the 
Italian Communist Party, forcing it to transform itself in-
to a more typical social democratic political and ideo-
logical formation. Then, in 1992, the anticorruption op-
eration Mani Pulite (clean hands), sometimes referred 
to as Tangentopoli, spearheaded by judges in Milan put 
the Christian Democrats and the Italian Socialist Party 
under enormous pressure (Lazar, 2013, p. 320). While 
the immediate cause of the collapse of the postwar 
party system was these exogenous shocks, the endoge-
nous decline within the context of political representa-
tion of the two dominant pillars of the postwar system, 
the Christian Democrats and the Italian Communist 
Party, had become manifest by the late 1980s. 
Shin and Agnew (2008, p. 68) provide data on the 
secular decline that the major parties faced before the 
external shock of the corruption scandals to the party 
system. Their data illustrate that between 1976 and 
1992 there had already been significant erosion in elec-
toral support for the largest parties relative to the rise 
in popular support for various “protest” parties such as 
the League and the Greens and a revived PSI. In 1976 
fully 73.1 percent of the vote for the Chamber of Depu-
ties went to DC and the PCI; but by 1987 this had fallen 
to 60.9 percent. And in 1992 DC and the two main heirs 
to the PCI (PDS and Refounded Communists) accounted 
for only 51.4 percent of the vote for the Chamber. So, if 
Tangentopoli was the defining moment for the final 
demise of the old system, the two largest parties had 
already begun losing their electoral centrality long be-
fore. The end of the cold war, the failure of DC to re-
spond adequately to the demands of its historic con-
stituency of small businesses in the Northeast, and the 
relative breakdown of the Communist and Catholic po-
litical sub-cultures (particularly the Catholic one) all 
seem to have played some role in this loss of centrality. 
In the institutional breach, two different forms of 
populism emerged. Berlusconi created, literally over-
night, a political party to take advantage of the vacuum 
left on the center-right with the collapse in 1993 of the 
long dominant Christian Democratic Party (DC), and 
Umberto Bossi’s insurgent regionalist movement took 
advantage of the crisis of the institutional status quo to 
propose a new form of political and social representa-
tion. More recently, the Five Star Movement has seized 
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on the crisis of representation afflicting the electoral 
and party systems dominated by Berlusconi, the North-
ern League, and the De Democratic Party (PD) to call 
for a radical overhaul of the political system. Grillo’s 
populism is calling for a less elite and party-dominated 
form of political representation. It relies heavily on so-
cial media and other nontraditional types of direct par-
ticipation to bring about what it claims are more direct 
and participatory forms of democratic representation. 
Mair (2002) feared that the rise of populism indi-
cated a systemic crisis of political representation across 
Western Europe. He saw the decline of party systems 
and increased voter volatility as manifestations of the 
crisis. The decline of political parties entailed the loss of 
an important intermediary institution between citizens 
and the state. Kriesi (2014, p. 364) provides a summary 
of Mair’s view on the function of parties in a democrat-
ic system: 
Arguably, political parties are the most important 
organizations linking voters and their representa-
tives in established democracies. But parties have a 
double function: they not only link civil society to 
the polity, they also organize and give coherence to 
the institutions of government. As Peter 
Mair…observes, their unique contribution to the 
development of modern democracy was that they 
combined these two crucial roles (representation 
and government) into one. 
If parties lose their representative function, Mair ar-
gued that this “opened the door for populist protest” 
(Kriesi, 2014, p. 361). Kriesi and Pappas (2015, p. 18) 
identified contrasting responses to the loss of repre-
sentative functions by parties in Europe: 
The populist surge has been particularly strong in 
Southern and Central-Eastern Europe. The two 
types of surges show, however, different patterns: 
while the more recent wave of CEE populism and 
anti-establishment mobilization more generally is 
partly (but certainly not exclusively) related to the 
emergence of “purifier” parties promising better 
and scandal-free governance, Southern European 
populism is generally highly polarizing, often anti-
systemic, and thriving on the left as well as on the 
right of the political spectrum. 
All three of the mechanisms identified by Pappas 
(2012) are evident in the rise of the Five Star Move-
ment. 
4. The Politicization of Resentment: The Rise of Civic 
Populism 
The M5S was born in 2005 as local civic lists and was of-
ficially founded in 2009. At the outset, the movement 
began as a blog by the Italian comedian, Beppe Grillo. 
Immediately, the blog gathered a large following. Grillo 
used his blog to comment on various political and so-
cial issues in Italy and globally. For example, the blog 
became a focal point for those in Italy who opposed the 
Iraq and Berlusconi’s support of President Bush. Some-
what like a “catch-all” phenomenon, Grillo’s blog had 
something for everyone. The most salient theme that 
he developed was his attack on the Italian political 
class, referred to as the “caste” (Rizzo & Stella, 2007). 
He highlighted the many privileges that elected officials 
in Italy benefited from and accused them of collusion 
and corruption. Using the internet as a focal point to 
galvanize an angry public, Grillo called for a day of ac-
tion―V-day―to clean up a corrupt parliament 
(Casaleggio & Grillo, 2011). 
Borrowing from the online activism tradition in the 
United States, Grillo called for the creation throughout 
Italy of local civic groups. As Mosca (2014, p. 41) points 
out, “initially, the blog represented an important hub 
for his fans all over the country. In July 2005, he sug-
gested that his supporters create local groups using the 
Meetup platform. As explicitly recognized by Casaleg-
gio, this choice was inspired by the American group 
MoveOn. Civic lists mushroomed. In some instances, 
they were newly created local groups and in others 
they were already existent groups that had been 
formed around local issues that joined the network 
(Lanzone, 2014). The objective of V-day of action was to 
crystallize the latent resentment against what Grillo 
identified as a corrupt political caste. The different civic 
groups were tasked with mobilizing supporters to pro-
test on 7 June 2007 in town centers throughout Italy. 
The success of V-day led to a V-day two the following 
year with Grillo collecting signatures for a referendum 
to abrogate the Gasparri law on the media that he 
claimed limited free speech. The civic lists entered the 
electoral arena in 2007 under the banner of “friends of 
Bepe Grillo”. Grillo invited these groups to aggregate 
themselves into a common movement under the symbol 
of the Five Star Movement. The five stars reflected the 
“catch-all” element of Grillo’s blog and protests. The 
stars represented one for clean energy, water, internet 
connectivity, garbage collection and social services. 
The Five Star Movement style of populism tied re-
sentment over local environmental and social services 
issues to a larger national theme of a non-
representative political caste (Bordignon & Ceccarini, 
2012). Typical of a populist strategy of communication, 
the M5S used resentment over different issues, in most 
cases local or regional, to crystallize the theme of “us” 
versus “them.” In this respect, the M5S emerged as a 
constellation of local issues galvanized around a popu-
list thematic of politics and political representation be-
ing about the real people. The movement’s political 
slogans emphasize the sovereign people (Bordignon & 
Ceccarini, 2013b). Grillo’s movement benefited from ty-
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ing local issues to national themes. The success of this 
strategy was demonstrated with M5S unexpected suc-
cess in the 2012 municipal elections followed a few 
months later with its triumph in regional elections in 
Sicily. In regards to the 2012 elections in Sicily, Grillo 
used the mix of online discussion and populist themes as 
way to support local M5S candidates despite little media 
coverage. He engaged in a variety of different publicity 
stunts to draw attention to himself and local issues. 
As Bobba and McDonnell (2012, p. 4) point out: 
The successful mixture of online and offline, Grillo 
and grassroots, was well in evidence during the Oc-
tober 2012 Sicilian regional election campaign. Hav-
ing swam (the relatively short distance) across to 
the island from Calabria, Grillo proceeded to pack 
out piazzas across Sicily in support of local M5S 
candidates chosen from the meet-ups. As a result, 
the M5S candidate for the regional presidency Gio-
vanni Cancelleri rose in just a few weeks from less 
than 5 per cent in the polls to take over 18 per cent 
(and third place) in the election. 
The linking of local issues with a broader populist themat-
ic is illustrated, for example, in the movement’s clever 
campaign poster that said, “vote for you” (Figure 1). 
Obviously, the objective was to mobilize the grow-
ing number of non-voters and those alienated from the 
mainstream parties. For obvious reasons, the politics of 
resentment focused on the “corrupt political caste”. In 
his 2013 national election campaign that Grillo called the 
“Tsunami Tour”, he invoked the metaphor of a wave 
washing away the corrupt Italian party system (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 1. “Vote for You.” 2012 Sicilian Regional Election Campaign.1  
 
  
Figure 2. Tsunami Tour. 2013 General Election Campaign.2 
                                                          
1 Posters are in the public domain and available on the movement’s website: http://www.beppegrillo.it/europee/diffondi/ 
2 http://www.beppegrillo.it/europee/diffondi/ 
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Essentially, M5S exploited the myriad of local and 
regional conflicts and controversies throughout the 
country and blamed their non-resolution on the politi-
cal “caste” in power in Rome. A good illustration of how 
M5S exploited local issues is how they inserted them-
selves into the long simmering controversy over con-
structing a tunnel for a high-speed train between Turin 
and Lyon. It was a salient issue in Piedmont and had of-
ten resulted in acts of violence to prevent the project 
going forward. Grillo framed the project as proof of the 
collusion between the political “caste” in power and 
the Mafia, stating that: 
They open the tunnel to the mafias! The Interna-
tional Treaty about Tav [the Turin– Lyon line] com-
promises to advantage the mafia structures. Ac-
cording to this international agreement, the 
contract work procedures about the Turin–Lyon’s 
constructive projects will be overpowered to the 
French legislation, where is missing a specific rules 
against mafia organizations. (Five Star Movement’s 
Senators, April 2014)3 
Although the M5S movement vehemently rejects being 
classified as a political party or engaged in politics in 
any traditional fashion, much of its rapid success is due 
to its “catch-all” populist strategy. This “catch-all strate-
gy” has allowed M5S movement to redefine old cleav-
ages and articulate new ones. 
Typically, populists present a transversal political 
ideology that transcends traditional dichotomies such 
as left and right and workers/owners. Populist move-
ments arise principally to recreate a lost authenticity of 
the people. Grillo’s movement is no different. Five Star 
Movement’s rhetoric on cleavage issues reflects a sort 
of trans-ideological strategy and more specifically an 
“anti-political” focus (Diamanti, 2013, p. XV), aimed at 
appealing to electors from different political tenden-
cies. The success of the Five Star Movement in the 
2013 elections suggests that this strategy worked since 
the party succeeded in attracting support across Italy 
and the traditional left-right divide. Unlike the populism 
of the Northern League and Forza Italia whose electoral 
success and appeal was concentrated in certain regions 
and appealed to center-right voters who had previously 
supported the Christian Democrats, the Five Star 
Movement largely overcame the normal left/right or 
north/south divisions. Distrust in traditional cleavages 
was demonstrated by Five Star Movement’s supporters 
in a web-survey realized in 2013 in which they indicated 
a strong interest in politics—67 percent declaring that 
they were interested in political issues—but a rejection 
                                                          
3Full text is available at this link: 
http://www.beppegrillo.it/movimento/parlamento/2014/04/t
av-aprono-il-tunnel-alle-mafie.html  
of the traditional left-right divide.4  
5. Redefining Cleavages through Populist Rhetoric 
With a “catch-all” thematic, the Five Star Movement 
has been able to put “old wine into new bottles” (Bor-
dignon & Ceccarini, 2013b). Unlike the Northern 
League that created ex nihilo a quasi ethno-regional 
cleavage out of northern resentment over taxes and 
state transfers to the poorer south or Berlusconi’s re-
packaging a traditional anti-communist theme, the Five 
Star Movement simply aggregated local issues into a na-
tional grievance framework. In doing so, it has been able 
to present itself as representative of the Italian people 
irrespective of region, class, past ideological affiliation. In 
this respect, it has emerged as the most successful trans-
ideological party on the Italian political scene. However, 
the aggregation of disparate local and regional issues 
threatens any attempt to fashion a more coherent ideo-
logical identity. This accounts for why Grillo and other 
M5S leaders are constantly on the attack against the 
“other”, i.e., corrupt and conniving politicians, austerity 
imposing external forces, and unscrupulous capitalists. 
All populist movements emphasize how an “other” 
threatens some essential quality of the people: be it 
cosmopolitan capitalism, finance elites, corrupt politi-
cians or foreign forces. Grillo’s rhetoric is infused with 
the populist thematic of the real people fighting against 
an entrenched and corrupt elite. This recurrent anti-
elitist refrain is employed to highlight the purported vir-
tues of the people as the source of political legitimacy 
(Meny & Surel, 2002). Also, the “us” versus “them” the-
matic of populist ideology and rhetoric is forever pre-
sent. In fact, the entire civic structure of the Five Star 
Movement is premised on the idea that it allows for a 
form of direct democracy that traditional political parties 
are against. As Bordignon and Ceccarini (2013b, p. 435) 
put it: 
The concept of political representation proposed by 
the M5S should be understood, then, as representa-
tiveness. The leader underlines this whenever “his” 
candidates run for elections: the resemblance be-
tween the public square and the MoVimento is ex-
plicitly presented as an alternative to the distance 
between citizens and politics: “They are all people 
like you. They are your mirror, democracy back to 
                                                          
4 The survey was carried out in 2013 by one of the coauthors 
(between the 27 of February and the 19 of March), with the 
CAWI method (Computer Assisted Web Interviewing), on a 
sample of 628 people. The questionnaire consisted of 34 ques-
tions. The web survey was hosted by the online platform “Sur-
vey Monkey”, thanks to the collaboration of the Five Star 
Movement’s local groups’ referents, which undertook to for-
ward the link to the national members. Political interest was 
measured on a 1–10 scale. The values cited in this paragraph 
consider the 8–10 preferences. 
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front”….”They are your people, taken from here and 
placed there….Surveyors, an engineer, a student, a 
lawyer, a drug dealer to keep our morale up a bit 
there are all sorts”…Politics, for Grillo, is a simple 
matter: the lack of professionalism and the inexpe-
rience of political employees are regarded as values, 
offering a guarantee that these people are extrane-
ous to the circuits of power. 
Distrust of elites is an old theme in Italian politics. Even 
before the collapse of the traditional post-World War II 
parties in the 1990s, Italians conveyed in opinion sur-
veys a growing distrust of parties and their governing 
class. Grillo reanimated this distrust in claiming that the 
parties that had replaced First Republic parties were no 
different. Little had really changed. He attacked parties 
across the political spectrum. Grillo’s leitmotif is that 
political parties are a kind of organized racket whose 
only interest in elections is to gain access to the privi-
leges and perks given to elected officials in Italy. His at-
tacks are stoked by widespread indignation about the 
political ruling class, now commonly referred as the 
“caste” (Rizzo & Stella, 2007). 
In various rallies and online discussion Grillo attacked 
the Italian political class as a corrupt and self-serving 
elite who had done little for real Italians. He argued that 
the major interest of career politicians was to gain par-
liamentary immunity, generous retirement benefits and 
expense accounts. Besides these rents, they cared little 
about policy or representation. Grillo contrasted the 
supposed spontaneous civic aspects of the Five Star 
Movement with the corrupt party system. He asserted 
that (cited in Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2013b, p. 435): 
The political parties are dead. Citizens need to de-
tach themselves from the dead while they are still 
in time”(PC19, 2009). “Politics is long since dead. 
Only vultures remain, who divide up the body of Ita-
ly” (PC28, 2009). Other recurrent contrasts are be-
tween truth and deceit, but also between small and 
big: “We are like David and Goliath. We only have 
the web, the MeetUps, our enthusiasm and my 
meetings. They have all the rest. We are the last, 
the excluded, the derided. That’s why we will suc-
ceed” (PC28, 2009). 
Another cleavage that the M5S seized upon is genera-
tional. Grillo and other Five Star Movement leaders 
pointed out that Italy was run by “old men” with little 
ability to connect with the Italian youth. All of the polit-
ical parties were dominated by a “gerontocracy”. 
“These politicians don’t know what they are talking 
about. They talk about the future. They are seventy 
years old and they talk about a future they will never 
see. We need young blood” (cited in Bordignon & Cec-
carini, 2014, p. 434). The movement’s use of social me-
dia was part of the generational divide that Grillo 
harped on. Facebook, tweeter and other online social 
media were used not only to announce V-day events 
but also to stake out positions on a range of issues from 
the environment, European Union, youth unemploy-
ment, corruption issues, media monopolies, to immi-
gration. The decentralized organizational style of the 
Five Star Movement is presented as something more in 
tune with a younger generation than the hierarchical 
traditional party structure. 
While the Five Star Movement has attracted a 
younger base of support than the main political parties, 
the evidence indicates that the movement key demo-
graphic are Italian men in their mid-forties with a rela-
tively high degree of interest in political and social is-
sues. Along with this interest in politics is a 
corresponding disposition for social participation via In-
ternet discussions; petitions initiatives, and signature 
and/or referendum proposals. For example, about 60% 
of respondents in a Demopolis survey of 1,206 have 
participated in local or environmental demonstrations, 
organized by M5S local groups. Overall, what emerges 
from the interviews is a propensity for new and alter-
native forms of mobilization and participation that con-
trast sharply with the more traditional mode of repre-
sentation of Italian parties.5 In her study of M5S 
activists, De Rosa (2013, p. 129) confirms our profile, 
Most of them were born in the South of Italy but 
live in the North-East. The vast majority of them are 
white-collar workers or self-employed professionals 
(in private firms or commerce) with a smaller group 
of university students…5SM activists would like to 
help Italy move forward but are blocked by a politi-
cal class who are incapable of modernising them-
selves or the country, preferring to insist with con-
servative strategies. When questioned, the 5SM 
activists appear very radical as regards public ad-
ministration, the media, the jobs market but much 
less so when it comes to support for a women’s quo-
ta in parliament or the abolition of the legal value of 
a university degree. They refute the idea of 
leaderism and anti-politics as media simplification 
and prefer to think of themselves as anti-bad politics. 
However, even with its focus on youth and technology, 
M5S is not really a youth movement. In keeping with 
the populist ideology of not representing groups based 
on ideology or class, Grillo makes a similar argument 
about generational divides. In fact, a central pillar in 
the Five Star Movement’s political program is the pro-
tection and enhancement of pension funds for retirees. 
                                                          
5 The survey was carried out by the Istituto Nazionale di Ricer-
che Demopolis from October 7–10, 2012 on a sample of 1,206 
interviewees, representative of all Italian adult citizens, subdi-
vided according to gender, age, and place of residence. 
http://www.demopolis.it 
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The movement’s blog has been used as a forum to crit-
icize the media and others for not addressing the crisis 
faced by Italian retirees. The Northern League is the on-
ly other political party that has highlighted the plight of 
Italian pensioners.6 
Although M5S defines itself as neither left nor right, 
it is viewed as having more of a center-left orientation 
on most socio-economic issues. In light of its “catch-all” 
characteristics and the contrasting policy positions it 
has taken a stance on, it is a difficult movement to pi-
geon hole. In fact, the base of support and mobilization 
of the M5S has varied over time depending on the type 
of topic and resentment it has sought to exploit. The 
data clearly indicates that the initial supporters of M5S 
were largely center-left. In 2010, “nearly half 48 per-
cent of the M5S supporters positioned themselves as 
center-left” (Lanzone & Scotto, 2014, p. 14). Two years 
later that number had dropped to 32 percent with 
those positioning themselves as center-right rising to 28 
percent from 11. The difficulty with classifying the M5S 
movement as center-left is illustrated with the rightest 
positions that Grillo has taken on the issue of immigra-
tion (Lanzone & Tronconi, 2015). 
Grillo, in particular, has staked out a position on 
immigration that is ideologically anchored to the right. 
For example, on the question of granting citizenship to 
the children of immigrants and overturning the puni-
tive laws regarding illegal immigrants in Italy, Grillo’s 
positioning on these divisive issues places him closer to 
the anti-immigrant Northern League. As Bordignon and 
Ceccarini noted (2013b, p. 433), “Grillo has declared his 
opposition to the granting of citizenship to the children 
of immigrants born in Italy, according to the principle of 
jus soli. Previously, he had strongly criticized the en-
largement of the EU to include Romania, and the pres-
ence of Roma in Italy, evoking the sacredness of the 
borders of the fatherland”. Grillo’s anti-immigrant 
stance has provoked tension within the movement. Fol-
lowing the death of immigrants off the coast of Sicily in 
2014 that led to some 5-Star movement elected sena-
tors calling for a reform of the Bossi-Fini law that crimi-
nalizes illegal immigrants (Woods, 2010). Grillo strongly 
rejected the call by M5S senators and threated to ex-
pulse them from the movement. He stated that “this 
amendment is an invitation to migrants from Africa and 
the Middle East to head for Italy….How many immi-
grants can we accommodate if one Italian in eight does 
not have money?” (O’leary, 2013). 
Another cleavage issue that Grillo has exploited is 
European integration. The European Union and integra-
tion had not been a salient issue in Italian politics. The 
left and the right as well as the general public had been 
overwhelmingly pro-European. The Northern League 
was the first political actor to disrupt the pro-European 
                                                          
6 See Grillo’s blog posting “Bye, bye pensions”. 
http://www.beppegrillo.it/en 
consensus. Although the party had initially been favora-
ble to European integration and the creation of the eu-
ro, it changed its tune and became stridently anti-
European. Until the emergence of the M5S movement, 
the Northern League had a kind of populist monopoly on 
anti-European rhetoric. Like with the immigration divide, 
Grillo seized on European integration cleavage that had 
been framed by a party on the right and redefined it in a 
new fashion. He called for Italy to leave the Euro and re-
ject the austerity dictates of the European commission. 
During the spring 2014 campaign for European par-
liament, Grillo stated, "We are Italy's Plan B", he told 
the BBC. "Brussels bureaucrats have distorted the 
dream of European democracy. Today, we are not at 
war with ISIS [Islamic State] or with Russia, we are at 
war with the European Central Bank!" (Bettiza, 2014). 
Much of Grillo anti-European appeal is tied to the eco-
nomic crisis that Italy has confronted since 2009. Many 
in Italy viewed the fall of Berlusconi government in 
2011 and the installation of a technocratic government 
led by Mario Monti as something that had been orches-
trated by the European Union under the guidance of 
Germany and France. Grillo seized upon the austerity 
measures adopted by Monti’s government as evidence 
that Italy had lost its freedom as a sovereign nation. In 
an interview, Grillo castigated the European Union for 
undermining the nation-state while proclaiming that he 
was a supporter of Europe: 
On the contrary, I’m a staunch supporter of Europe, 
but I’d like to see the very concept of Europe revis-
ited. When Monnet, along with many others, creat-
ed Europe, he founded it on coal and steel―on 
tangible things. He was no technocrat. He used the 
post-war Marshall Plan manna. He knew that steel 
and coal were in German hands and that France 
would never manage these materials. He acted this 
way to manage concrete material. Now Europe is 
based on abstracts. Look at our finances. We have 
not only transferred our monetary sovereignty, but 
also our food supply. Do you realize that Italy has 
the best food in the world? Milk production centers 
are French. Supermarkets are French while ours are 
closing down one after the other. The free move-
ment of workers has become the free movement of 
slaves. There are Georgians working on Romanian 
building sites. In Georgia there are Ukrainians and 
so on. It’s the production of new slaves. 7 
A recurrent element that runs through Grillo’s anti-
European rhetoric is the question of representation. 
Like his criticism of the Italian “political caste”, Grillo 
                                                          
7 Interviewed by Guiseppe Santoliquido, see We want to make 
honesty fashionable again 
(http://blog.lesoir.be/lesoirinenglish/2013/05/18/beppe-grillo-
we-want-to-make-honesty-fashionable-again).  
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argues that the European Union is dominated by tech-
nocrats and self-interested politicians who care little 
about the “real people”. 
6. The Organizational Form of the Five Star 
Movement: Personalized Representation 
Scholars generally view populist organizations as 
movements rather than parties. This categorization has 
developed because populism has historically been the 
carrier of anti-elitist (and also anti-system) ideological 
messages. Populist leaders often emerge initially from 
social and political movements and strongly reject what 
they claim is the non-representative nature of tradi-
tional political parties. In this respect, the Five Star 
Movement is no different. The Five Star Movement 
emerged as a protest movement and still views itself 
something different than a typical political party. It is a 
sort of non-traditional amorphous party that folds myr-
iad of local and regional issues under the same tent. 
Different from the “catch-all” parties of the past, the 
Five Star Movement does not have a large militant 
membership base. It relies on local “cleavage issue” en-
trepreneurs to mobilize supporters. Moreover, it is not a 
centralized bureaucratic party but more an amalgama-
tion of local affiliates that are subservient to its charis-
matic leader. Local groups’ activities―concentrated in 
the major cities―are characterized especially by 
square meetings and informative gazebos, but also by 
territorial petitions. However, it is only in online politi-
cal discussions that M5S adherents are more active 
than supporters of other political movements in Italy.8 
Thus, the web and Grillo’s blog are clearly foci points 
that supporters of the movement use to engage in dis-
cussions and debates on a wide range of issues. As an 
indicator of its democratic credentials and authenticity, 
web-based referenda and votes are used regularly by 
the movement’s leaders. These referenda are framed 
and dominated by Beppe Grillo to such an extent that 
claims to real democratic participation are dubious 
(Virgilio, Giannetti, Pedrazzani, & Pinto, 2015). 
Grillo is not only the founder and leader of the 
movement, but he is also its sole proprietor of its 
brand. The Five Star Movement is registered as a 
trademark on behalf of Beppe Grillo. Taggart (1995, p. 
41) argues that such personalization of movements and 
parties is a structural characteristic of populism. He 
adds that “…the leadership is not a simple structural el-
ement. It is the mainstay of their messages and of their 
                                                          
8 Results from a web-based survey conducted between Febru-
ary 27 to March 13 2013 (method: Computer Assisted web-
interviewing utilizing the diffusion technique known as survey 
monkey) of 628 individuals. Surveyed individuals responded to 
thirty-four structured questions that sought to assess their ide-
ological orientation, level of civic participation, and online ac-
tivism. 
party”. In other words, charisma constitutes the ce-
ment of the entire project and is also the main mobili-
zation vehicle to keep their supporters (McDonnell, 
2015). The populist leader is pivotal to exploiting and 
polarizing popular resentment against the status quo 
(Ruggiero, 2012). In this respect, Grillo’s personalized 
style of civic populism and some of his ac-
tions/demonstrations are reminiscent of the rise of Um-
berto Bossi. Grillo has recognized the parallel himself: 
If I am resembled to Bossi, I not aggrieve myself, 
because Bossi was a street fighter with his under-
shirt. At that time, he screamed “Berlusconi you are 
a Mafioso”. He said surprising things. Then, he be-
came part of the system and the same system is 
addled. And so he entered in the Banks, in the milk 
quotas, in the dream of this Padania that it borders 
to Duck-burg. Bossi lost the sense of his thoughts. 
(Beppe Grillo, April 15, 2012)9 
In this message, Grillo emphasized again his opposition 
to the current political system and its political “caste”, 
whose self-interested actions results in a betraying of 
the Italian people. 
His personalization of M5S and his difficulty in al-
lowing elected representatives of the movement much 
autonomy does not bode well for its future. However, 
its organizational flexibility and aggregation of dispar-
ate local and regional grievances appear to be sources 
of resilience. In recent regional elections, M5S lost 
votes but showed a remarkable presence in Italy’s 
many small and medium sized towns in the seven re-
gions in which the elections took place. Across the sev-
en regions, it averaged about 17 percent of the vote. 
7. Conclusion 
The Five Star Movement is indicative of the kind of 
populist surge that has swept across Europe. Grillo has 
identified a broad range of local, regional and national 
issues over which there is a great degree of resentment 
and tethered them to the populist rhetoric of being a 
non-traditional political party that emerged as a true 
form of democratic representation. Like other populist 
movements, M5S sees itself as providing the real peo-
ple with a true form of political representation that has 
been confiscated by elites. Bepe Grillo, as political en-
trepreneur, has stepped into the vacuum that Mair 
(2002) feared would be the consequence of the decline 
of traditional mediating role of European party system. 
What sets Grillo’s populist style apart is the use 
non-traditional media to mobilize supporters. In this 
sense, Grillo’s movement is an example of a relatively 
new type of “web-based populism” (Corbetta, 2013, p. 
                                                          
9 The full Grillo’s message is available at this link: 
http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=pM9XTOR4MzU  
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197). The use of the web has allowed M5S to combine 
old and new strategies of communication and mobiliza-
tion. The use of the web and the actup and meetups in 
local centers in Italy lets the movement claim that it 
has finally brought to Italy a more direct form of de-
mocracy. In keeping with the logic of populism, it has 
done away with the traditional intermediaries of politi-
cal parties and labor unions to allow the people to di-
rectly engage in politics via online discussion forums 
and public engagements. In general, all these aspects 
underline a heterogeneous base of M5S members and, 
more generally, voters characterized by the common 
resentment against political elites and traditional politi-
cal parties (De Rosa, 2013). 
The rise of the M5S is captured well by the three 
mechanisms specified in Pappas’ model. Grillo’s M5S 
movement seized on a pervasive resentment towards It-
aly’s political class, it repackaged old cleavages or ani-
mated new ones and it effectively used non-traditional 
communication means to articulate an “us” versus 
“them” picture of political representation. The Five Star 
Movement was able to exploit to its advantage the 
strong resentment among many Italians towards their 
governing elite and to put together a heterogeneous 
base of support; however, this diversity of resentments 
makes it hard for the party to develop a coherent identi-
ty. After all, the old cleavages were able, for a long time, 
to engender some degree of loyalty among supporters 
who considered the party as the best vehicle for repre-
sentation and participation in political life. It is not obvi-
ous that Grillo’s volatile personality and “catch-all” 
strategy to aggregating local and regional grievances will 
suffice in transforming a potential majority into a real one. 
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